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Edmund Burke, John Whyte and Themes in 
Canadian Constitutional Culture 
David Schneiderman 'f 
John U7hyte, the author observes, is committed to the idea that there are moral foundations to 
Canada's constitutional order and that these foundations are derived from liberal principles. 
This paper compares U7hyte's liberal and organ!cist constitutionalism to that of the eightennth 
century British political thinker, Edmund Burke. Three themes are predominant in U7hyte's 
work: those of liberty and security, unity and diversity, and constitutional change. Drawing 
out these themes in both U7hyte's and Burke's constitutional thought, the author argues that 
U7hyte has a sound historical basis for deriving Canadian constitutional practices from liberal 
principles ordinarily associated with Burke. The author concludes by asking this question: if 
Canadian constitutionalism can be reduced to liberalism, what distinguishes Canada from the 
United States, and more critically, what will prevent Canada from being absorbed into a 
larger North A merican political unit? 
Introduction 
I. Themes in John Whyte's Work 
II. Themes in Burke's Constitutionalism 
Conclusion 
Introduction 
For much of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it safely can 
be said that English-Canadian constitutional law scholarship was not 
overtly concerned with the moral questions raised by the exercise of 
political authority. We also could say that Canada's first constitutional 
* Faculty of Law and Department of Political Science, University of Toronto and 
Visiting Sabbatical Scholar, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to Martha 
Bailey for having organized the welcome and long overdue tribute to John Whyte; to 
Jean Leclair, Rod Macdonald and John Whyte for comments; and to Pierre Asselin for 
research assistance. I am pleased to acknowledge research funding suppOrt from the 
University of Toronto Faculty of Law Summer Assistantship Programme and the Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council. 
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law text, A.H.F. Lefroy's Law of Legislative Power in Canada,! initiated 
this trend. A.V. Dicey, in a review of the book, emphasized the aridity 
of textual style adopted by Lefroy. Though an "excellent" work, it 
amounted to a mere legal "code" - an attempt to "digest a department 
of law into a series of articles, followed by explanatory comment."2 It 
can be said, finally, that John Whyte has been the vanguard in this 
department of law, inspiring those of us devoted to the idea that there is 
a deep structure at work in Canadian constitutional law - a "deeper 
common conception of the basic constitutional order"3- and that it is 
the task of constitutional theorists to mine it. 
But constitutional theory, as Martin Loughlin has argued, is more than 
the moral theorizing associated with political philosophy. Rather than 
involving an inquiry into ideal forms, thereby being "absorbed" into 
philosophy, constitutional theory should be preoccupied with "actually 
existing constitutional arrangements."4 It is the task of the constitutional 
theorist, then, to locate institutions and patterns of behaviour that make 
up the constitutional practices of a given polity. This neatly sums up 
John Whyte's methodology. Constitutional theory, for Whyte, entails a 
search for the moral foundations of Canadian constitutionalism5 as 
derived from its practice. To speak of moral foundations is not merely 
to point to an ideal set of abstract principles but, following Richard 
Rorty, to say they have a point only "insofar as they incorporate tacit 
reference to a whole range of institutions, practices, and vocabularies of 
moral and political deliberation."6 There are ideas, practices and 
1. Augustus Henry Lefroy, The Law of Legislative Power in Canada (Toronto: The 
Toronto Law Book and Publishing Co., 1897-98). 
2 .. Albert Venn Dicey, "Review of The Law of Legislative Power in Canada" (1898) 14 
L.Q. Rev. 198 at 198, 200. 
3. John D. Whyte, "Legality and Legitimacy: The Problem of Judicial Review of 
Legislation" (1987) 12 Queen's L.J. 1 at 5 [Whyte, "Legality"]. 
4. Martin Loughlin, "Constitutional Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay" (2005) 25 
Oxford J. Legal Stud. 183 at 186. 
5. To borrow from Samuel V. LaSelva, Moral Foundations of Canadian Federalism: 
Paradoxes, Achievements, and Tragedies of Canadian Nationhood (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996). 
6. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989) at 59. 
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vocabularies embedded within Canada's constitution, Whyte insists, and 
they are ideas derived from liberal principles. It safely can be said that 
John Whyte is Canada's foremost theorist of the liberal foundations of 
Canada's constitutional order. In this paper, I argue that Whyte has a 
sound historical basis for deriving Canadian constitutional practice from 
liberal principles. I show this by tracing his constitutional ideas back to 
those of the eighteenth century thinker Edmund Burke.7 
Let me explain why Burke helps to illuminate Whyte's views about the 
moral foundations· of Canadian constitutionalism. Political theorist 
Sheldon Wolin has described two distinct schools of thought on the nature 
of what he calls "organizationallife."g The first Wolin labels "organicist." 
Associated with the eighteenth-century politician and writer Edmund 
Burke, organicists view organized society as responding to complex 
historical and social environments. Political society, according to organicist 
thought, must take account of the needs of its own members, rather than 
imposing upon them alien modes of thinking. In contrast are the 
"rationalists," who arrange society according to specific purposes. Wolin 
associates them with the rationality of "efficiency." 9 
Whyte's constitutionalism, I want to argue, is liberal and organicist. For 
these reasons, there are interesting parallels between Whyte and Burke. 
Burke's philosophy helps to illuminate Whyte's views on the moral 
foundations of Canadian constitutionalism. Those aspects of Burke's 
thinking that are liberal, pluralist and anti-imperialist in orientation join 
nicely with aspects of Canadian constitutionalism at its origins. 
7. There is something of a tradition in drawing connections between Burke and 
contemporary legal theory. This essay might be viewed as yet another contribution to 
this literature. See e.g. Anthony T. Kronman, "Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of 
Prudence" (1985) 94 Yale L.J. 1567 (tracing Burke's influence on Bickel); and Peter Read 
Teachout, "Soul of the Fugue: An Essay on Reading Fuller" (1986) 70 Minn. L. Rev. 1073 
(tracing Burke's influence on Lon Fuller). 
8. Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political 
Thought, expanded ed. (princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) at 367. This is no 
observation original to Wolin. See e.g. J.G.A. Pocock, "Burke and the Ancient Constitution: 
A Problem in the History of Ideas" in J.G.A. Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on 
Political Though and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989) c. 6 at 203. 
9. There are obvious affinities here to the work of Gad Horowitz, which I will not 
pursue here. See Gad Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada: An 
Interpretation" (1966) 32 Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 143. 
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I am emphasizing here the liberal enlightenment side of Burke - the 
side that Harold Laski trumpets - the Burke whose "springs 
of ... compassion were as wide as they were deep" gives "substantial 
content" to the liberal political philosophy associated with Locke. lo It is 
not the Burke highlighted in C.B. Macpherson's little book - the 
"devout defender of hierarchy, prescription and inherited rights"ll-
but, the one that U day Singh Mehta draws out well in Liberalism and 
Empire. 12 Mehta's verdict is that Burke's attention to "local conditions"13 
made his non-parochial version of liberalism favourable to conditions of 
pluralism and openness: "an openness to the world, to its unavoidable 
contingencies, surprises, and ambivalences."14 Mehta is inspired by 
Burke's almost violent reproach of the conduct of the British East India 
Company and Governor General Warren Hastings in India, and Burke's 
sympathetic appeal to the interests of South Asians. Mehta celebrates 
this Burke, for whom "difference ... cannot be assimilated" and for 
whom the project of empire is "no more than a conversation between 
two strangers."15 
Much ink has been spilled on Burke's stand on India, Ireland and 
America. 16 Much less attention has been paid to the import of his 
10. Harold J. Laski, The Rise of European Liberalism: An Essay in Interpretation (London: 
Unwin Books, 1958) at 196-97. 
11. C.B. Macpherson, Burke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) at 4. 
12. Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth·Century British 
Liberal Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
13. Ibid. at 41. 
14. Ibid. at 42. 
15. Ibid. at 22 [emphasis in original]. 
16. The bibliography of works would be excessively long. For representative samples, 
see Macpherson, supra note 11; Mehta, supra note 12; Isaac Kramnick, The Rage of 
Edmund Burke: Portrait of an Ambivalent Conservative (New York: Basic Books, 
1977); Luke Gibbons, Edmund Burke and Ireland: Aesthetics, Politics, an the Colonial 
Sublime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Francis Canavan, The 
Political Economy of Edmund Burke: The Role of Property in his Thought (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1995); Bruce P. Frohnen & Charles J. Reid Jr., "Diversity 
in Western Constitutionalism: Chartered Rights, Federated Structure, and Natural 
Law Reasoning in Burke's Theory of Empire" (1997-98) 29 McGeorge L. Rev. 27; 
Conor Cruise O'Brien, The Great Melody: A Thematic Biography and Commented 
Anthology of Edmund Burke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); F.P. Lock, 
Edmund Burke, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). 
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positions in the face of Britain's newly conquered subjects in Canada. 17 
Burke's views on Canada, it turns out, were quite complex. This paper 
begins the task of situating Burke's thought in the colonial era in 
Quebec, suggesting continuities between his thinking and the origins of 
the modern Canadian state. Much more work needs to be done to 
connect Burke's ideas to the ruling ideas of British imperial policy in 
Canada - work that will not be done here. Rather, my modest aim is to 
connect Whyte's claims about Canada's liberal origins to liberal 
thinking, as represented by Burke, in the eighteenth century. This kind 
of study is instructive, as it is in this period that foundational decisions 
were made that would determine the constitutional course British 
North America ultimately took. It is not that imperial authority at the 
time invoked Burkean language and discourse; "I have always been in 
the Minority," Burke is reported to have said. IS Burkean discourse, I 
would argue, emerged more clearly in the mid-nineteenth century.19 
Rather, it is that colonial policy in Quebec ended up largely consistent 
with some of Burke's expressed sentiments on colonial policy in India 
and America. 
I begin by drawing out some principal themes from John Whyte's 
work and then contrast these themes with Burke's thinking. The three 
themes are: (1) liberty and security; (2) unity and diversity; and (3) 
constitutional change. 
17. The last two works cited in note 16 are exceptions in a way. Both O'Brien and Lock 
devote a few pages 10 Burke's quiet defence of Roman Catholicism in Quebec during the 
Quebec Act debates. Christopher Moore links up Burke's influence on thinking at the 
time of Confederation, a different period than the one addressed here, particularly to 
Edward Whelan. For Moore, Burke's influence on the 1867 framers lies in the realm of 
promoting parliamentary government in confrontations with the monarch. This is 
exemplified in Edmund Burke, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents, 3d ed. 
(London: J. Dodsley, 1770). See Christopher Moore, 1867: How the Fathers Made a Deal 
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1997) c. 3. 
18. Thomas W. Copeland, ed., The Correspondence of Edmund Burke, 1729-1797, voU 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958) at 285, n.1. 
19. See e.g. selections from the Elgin-Gray correspondence in James Bruce, Earl of Elgin 
& Henry George Grey, Earl of Grey, The Elgin·Grey Papers, 1846-1852, ed. by Sir Arthur 
G. Doughty (Ottawa: ].0. Patenaude, 1937). 
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I. Themes in John Whyte's Work 
Whyte has been clear about the values that constitutionalism 
promotes: they concern both liberty and security. In 1997 he wrote, 
"Political stability is the chief object in constructing the basic 
framework of the state."20 Stability lays the foundation for harmony and 
social solidarity between citizens,21 making secure those preferences 
made in the private sphere:22 
The good society is the product of personal choices - choices of commitment, 
investment and sacrifice - and the condition of making these choices is that one's social 
contributions will not be pirated through conditions of revolutionary changes in the 
political order, by those who sponsor such change.23 
This theme of liberty and security runs throughout much of the work 
that I have examined. Constitutionalism, according to this account, is 
about limitations on government and about providing minimum levels 
of security against arbitrariness and tyranny.24 "Legalism, "25 premised 
upon rule of law principles and judicial review, is the surest means of 
reconciling both popular sovereignty and the desire for security and 
predictability. "Law's ideal," Whyte writes, "is to offer liberty and 
development while it offers restraint and continuity."26 This is why 
Whyte, in the controversy that has arisen over judicial review under the 
Charter, has weighed in on the side of the judges.27 The legalism 
associated with judicial review can both provide stability and enrich 
20. John D. Whyte, "A Review of Samuel V. LaSelva, The Moral Foundations of 
Canadian Federalism" (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 189 at 189 [Whyte, "Review"]. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Whyte,"Legality", supra note 3 at 13. 
23. Whyte, "Review", supra note 20 at 189. 
24. Whyte, "Legality", supra note 3 at 8-9. 
25. John D. Whyte, "The Charter of Rights in Canadian Political Culture: Law, Rights 
and Democracy" (2003) 19 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 449 at 451 [Whyte, "Culture"]. See also 
Whyte, "Legality", supra note 3. 
26. Ibid. at 453. 
27. John D. Whyte, "On Not Standing for Notwithstanding" (1990) 28 Alta L. Rev. 347 
and Whyte, "Legality", supra note 3. 
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political outcomes: "a judicially-administered Charter can point 
[citizens] to sound political accommodations and, perhaps, help create 
the peaceable society. "28 Let me add, parenthetically, that Whyte 
continues to expect the judiciary to make valuable contributions to 
public policy when - and the recent Chaoulli case,29 striking down a 
Quebec law on privatized health care, is the best example of this - there 
is a lot of evidence to the contrary. 
The second prominent theme in Whyte's work concerns the value of 
both unity and diversity captured in Canada's federal arrangements. The 
unity angle is represented by his insistence that there exists a Canadian 
"nation." This nation is never fully defined - his task is more modest, 
he says, believing that we can never be "wholly self-defining. "30 One 
might find the source of unity in a "liberal conception of justice" 
premised upon the equality of persons. This might be exemplified, for 
Whyte, by the guarantee of rights and freedoms laid out in the Charter. 3 ! 
Diversity through federalism also promotes liberal legalism by 
establishing competing centres of power, and so acts as a prophylactic 
for vulnerable communities from the tyranny of the national majority.32 
Federalism "establishes the conditions of ongoing mediation ... and it 
offers principles that guide the practices of accommodation."33 If Whyte 
appreciates that provinces both are countervailing institutions and are 
28. Whyte, "Culture", supra note 25 at 467. 
29. Chaoulli v. Quebec (A.G.), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791. I have written about the implications 
of the Chaoulli case with Tracey Epps in "Opening Medicare to our Neighbours or 
Crosing the Door on a Public System: International Trade Law Implications of Chaoulli 
v. Quebec", in Colleen M. Flood, Kent Roach & Lome Sossin, eds., Access to Care, Access 
to Justice: The Legal Debate over Private Health Insurance in Canada (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2005) 369. 
30. John D. Whyte, "Nations, Minorities and Authority" (1991) 40 U.N.B.L.J. 45 at 49 
[Whyte, "Nations"]. 
31. At the symposium where an earlier version of this paper was presented, I suggested 
that, based on his earlier writing, this unity for Whyte was exemplified by the judicature 
section (s. 96) of the 1867 Act. Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted 
in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No.5. Whyte commented that his views since have changed - as 
evidenced by his promotion of aboriginal justice systems in Saskatchewan - and so this 
source of unity no longer is available to him. 
32. Whtye, "Review", supra note 20 at 192. 
33. Whyte, "Culture", supra note 25 at 454. 
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best suited to respond to local concerns,34 he is also attentive to the fact 
that this might lead to illiberal outcomes. This desire to balance both 
unity and difference is best represented in Whyte'S innovative scheme 
for resurrecting the federal trade and commerce power, set out in his 
study for the MacDonald Royal Commission.35 This was a proposal for 
a national regulatory power over trade and commerce, together with 
provincial paramountcy and a national legislative override - a masterful 
attempt at capturing the typically Canadian ambivalence between centre 
and periphery. 
The third theme concerns constitutional change. Liberal constitutionalism, 
according to Whyte, does not insist on stasis, only on orderly change; not on 
frozen rights, but on prudence and humility in the alteration of rights. "We 
are born into past commitments and inherit them, "36 and this requires that 
Canadians "value what we are. "37 The English system of common law 
perhaps best represents this inheritance of orderly change, resulting in 
deference to the established order and ways of doing things, but not 
necessarily in paralysis. Whyte's opposition to the 1997 Meech Lake Accord 
can be read as an expression of prudence as regards prior commitments.38 
Whyte voiced concerns not only about the Accord's "more general impact in 
terms of fundamental Canadian political values"39 but about its potential for 
hampering new cost-shared programs, precluding senate reform, impeding 
constitutional change, and enshrining an "enclave-based language policy."40 
The Accord, in Whyte's view, placed Canada "under disability as a nation."41 
34. John D. Whyte, "Constitutional Aspects of Economic Development Policy" in 
Richard Simeon, ed., Division 0/ Powers and Public Policy (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1985) 29 at 46. 
35. Ibid. at 44-46. 
36. Whyte, "Nations", supra note 30 at 49. 
37. Whyte, "Review", supra note 20 at 19l. 
38. One might also read Whyte's criticism of the failure of the Prime Minister and provincial 
premiers to live up to the Constitution Act, 1982's commitment to reconsider the amending 
formulae in a similar light. See John D. Whyte, "'A Constitutional Conference ... Shall Be 
Convened ... ': Living with Constitutional Promises" (1996-97) 8 Const. Forum Const. 15. 
39. John D. Whyte, "More than Small Change: The Meaning of Meech Lake for the 
Canadian Polity" (1989) 38 U.N.B.L.J. 279 at 281. 
40. The latter point refers to the distinct society clause, ibid. at 285. 
41. John D. Whyte, "Submission to the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of 
Commons on the 1987 Constitutional Accord" (1987) 94 Queen's Quarterly 793 at 796. 
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Political order, however, does not "imprison citizens in a fixed state."42 A 
liberal legal regime cultivates both order and change. Whyte described 
federalism in 1867 as having the goal of achieving both "stability and 
dynamism - stability in the relations between deeply suspicious and hostile 
communities, and dynamism that would see a national consciousness grow 
and, with it, national legitimacy and national political capacity."43 
Canadian constitutional law, however, plays only a modest, limited and 
contingent role in Whyte's account of order and change.44 The source of 
Canadian political legitimacy and identity resides elsewhere, other than in 
the constitution. "[1]t is a consequence of a life lived together"45- it does 
not originate in some foundational constitutional moment or text. 
These three themes of liberty and security, unity and diversity, and 
constitutional change appear to converge in Whyte's submission on 
behalf of the Attorney General of Saskatchewan in the Quebec Secession 
Reference.46 First, he argued that faith in the stability and predictability 
of the constitution, secured by legalism, required following the 
processes laid down for amendment to the constitution in Part V. 
42. Whtye, "Review", supra note 20 at 189. 
43. Ibid. at 190. Note the centralist tilt: dynamism here is associated with the Canadian 
nationalist project, not the provincialist one. 
44. John D. Whyte, "The Secession Reference and Constitutional Paradox" in David 
Schneiderman, ed., The Quebec Decision: Perspectives on the Supreme Court Ruling on 
Secession (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1999) 130 at 131. 
45. Ibid. 
46. Portions of this are reproduced in John D. Whyte, "If Quebec leaves, it must leave by the 
rules" The Globe and Mail (19 February 1998) A25. The preceding quotes are drawn from that 
verbatim transcript. Whyte's submissions were portrayed in a positive light by the English-
language press. They were described as an "impassioned argument" by Graham Fraser in 
"Crees demand right to stay in Canada: Quebec's unilateral secession called violation of 
natives' constitutional rights" The Globe and Mail (18 February 1998) A 1. Paul Wells described 
Whyte as advancing the "radical theory that Canada is a nation that works": Paul Wells, 
"Democracy - in action and words" The Gazette (18 February 1998) A8. The submissions 
formed the basis of an op-ed piece: Andrew Coyne, "Canada has right to say no to seccession" 
The Gazette (19 February 1998) B3. Whyte, in other words, articulated a vision of Canada that 
was missing from many of the legal arguments before the Supreme Court in the Secession 
Reference. It was for this reason, I believe, that he was asked for permission to publish his 
remarks verbatim in the op-ed pages of The Globe and Mail the following day. See discussion in 
Florian Sauvageau, David Schneiderman & David Taras, The Last Word: Media Coverage of the 
Supreme Court of Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) at 109. 
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, 
Second, and inspired by Georges-Etienne Cartier, Whyte insisted that at 
Confederation a "new transcendent organic reality was created" - a new 
nation was formed that was exclusively neither English nor French. 
Federalism guided relations between the national communities, so that 
the "threads of a thousand acts of accommodation" will have built the 
fabric of the Canadian nation. Third, a desire to protect the national 
integrity of this political unit cannot stand in the way of orderly change. 
National integrity is not "eternal and certainly not absolute," as 
reflected in the rules for amendment in Part V. "Members of this 
nation," however, "are due the protection of those rules." 
II. Themes in Burke's Constitutionalism 
In this part, I turn to Burke's constitutional thought as it reflects the 
three principal themes of liberty and security, unity and diversity, and 
constitutional change. Recall that Laski credits Burke for having given 
substantive content to what, in Locke's second treatise, was a 
metaphysical outline of the state.47 Burke would have welcomed this 
compliment, for he resented sacrificing conventions and customs in 
favour of abstract theorizing.48 It was not theorizing per se that he found 
problematic; rather, his ire was directed at theoretical abstractions that 
ignored the lessons of societal experience learned over time - this he 
called "weak, erroneous, fallacious, unfounded, or imperfect theory."49 
Societies should not be expected to conform to some fixed idea of a 
constitutional order. Instead, the constitution should conform to a 
society's habits and customs. so With an impending revolt against the 
British Crown, Burke, for instance, implored Parliament to 
47. Laski, supra note 10 at 196. 
48. Edmund Burke, "Letter of Edmund Burke to Charles O'Hara" (26 July 1775) in 
George H. Gutteridge, ed., The Correspondence of Edmund Burke, vol.3 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1961) 181 at 182. 
49. Edmund Burke, "Natural Rights vs. the Prescriptive Constitution" in Ross J.S. 
Hoffman & Paul Levack, eds., Burke's Politics: Selected Writings and Speeches of Edmund 
Burke on Reform, Revolution, and War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949) 225 at 228. 
50. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. by F.G. Selby (London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1898) at 49 [Burke, Reflections]. 
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govern America according to [their] nature, and to [their] circumstances; and not 
according to our own imaginations; nor according to abstract ideas of right; by no means 
to mere general theories of government, the resort of which appears to me, in our present 
situation, no better than arrant trifling. 51 
The English Constitution, in this way, was well-suited to the 
temperament of the English people over time. The constitution, Burke 
famously proclaimed, was an "entailed inheritance" derived from his 
forefathers, much like an estate passed on through every generation. 52 A 
constitutional policy "working after the pattern of nature," he wrote, is 
transmitted and received in the same way as property is transmitted 
through inheritance.53 What pattern of constitutional ordering best 
suited the people of England? It was one of liberty and security - "the 
only liberty I mean, is a liberty connected with order"54- centred 
around respect for choices made in the private sphere. Burke associated 
the idea of justice with liberty exercised in the private sphere. Justice 
included the right to the fruits of one's industry, to the acquisitions of 
one's parents, to nourishment and improvement of offspring, and "to 
instruction in life, and consolation in death."55 It was in this partnership 
in the pursuit of justice that "all men have equal rights; but not to equal 
things. "56 For Burke, the constitution provided the requisite liberty and 
security necessary for people to thrive in the bourgeois private sphere. 
This classical account of liberal constitutionalism was qualified by 
constitutionalism's necessity to conform to complex social and political 
environments - to derive constitutional principles that fit the facts. 
The themes of unity and diversity help to fill out the liberalism-in-
context approach preferred by Burke. The concept of empire, with its 
common law under a single sovereign, exemplified the most desirable 
sort of unity. "My only earnest wish," he wrote in a 1779 letter, is "to 
51. Edmund Burke, "Speech on moving the resolutions on conciliation with the 
colonies" (22 March 1775) in The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, vol. 1 
(London: Bohn's British Classics, 1856) at 456 [Burke, Works]. 
52. Burke, Reflections, supra note 50 at 36. 
53. Ibid. 
54. "Speeches at Mr. Burke's arrival at Bristol" (1774) in Burke, Works, supra note 52 at 441. 
55. Burke, Reflections, supra note 50 at 65. 
56. Ibid. 
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see every part of this Empire, and every denomination of men in it 
happy and contented, and united on one common bottom of equality 
and justice."57 On the other hand, there was the virtue of each unit 
within the empire pursuing distinctive paths according to local 
conditions. Burke decried what he called "the state bed of uniformity."58 
He valued, instead, diversity in the various parts that formed the 
empire: "an empire is the aggregate of many states under one common 
head ... in such constitutions, the subordinate parts have many local 
privileges and immunities. "59 Granting power to individual assemblies 
would not "dissolve the unity of the empire" - indeed, "the very idea of 
the subordination of parts" is inconsistent with a "notion of simple and 
undivided unity. "60 "England is the head," he declared, "but she is not 
the head and the members too." 61 The federal idea, then, was at the root 
of Burke's understanding of empire.62 
Burke, like Hegel, saw attachment to local conditions as the 
prerequisite to attachment to the whole. Attachment "to the 
subdivision, to love the little platoon," he wrote, "is the first link in the 
series by which we proceed towards a love to our country and to 
mankind. "63 Places, with their own distinctive forms of order and 
attachment, partially made people.64 And so Burke was concerned with 
threats to embattled communities in places like Ireland and India, under 
57. Edmund Burke, "Letter of Edmund Burke to Anthony Dermott" (17 August 1779) 
in John A. Woods, ed., The Correspondence of Edmund Burke, vol. 4 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1963) 120 at 121. 
58. Edmund Burke, "Observations on a Late Publication intitled The Present State of the 
Nation" (1769) in The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, vol. 1 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1906) 258 at 311. 
59. "Speech on moving the resolutions on conciliation with the colonies" (22 March 
1775) in Burke, Works, supra note 51 at 476. 
60. Ibid. at 501. 
61. Ibid. 
62. Bruce Frohnen, "An Empire of Peoples: Burke, Government and National 
Character" in Ian Crowe, ed., The Enduring Edmund Burke: Bicentennial Essays 
(Wilmington: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1997) 128 at 139·41. 
63. Burke, Reflections, supra note 50 at 51. On Hegel, see Allen W. Wood, ed., Hegel: 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by Hugh Barr Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). 
64. Mehta, supra note 12 at 160. 
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the thumb of a callous English imperialism. But the local was linked to 
the national and beyond, and it was the task of the legislator to maintain 
equipoise among the myriad interests of the city, the nation, and then 
the empire: "all of these widespread interests must be considered; must 
be compared; must be reconciled, if possible."65 
Burke acted on these principles in at least one respect as it concerned 
Britain's "new subjects" of Canada. Francis Maseres, Quebec Attorney 
General in the 1780s, reported that Burke was instrumental in securing the 
appointment of a consecrated Roman Catholic bishop for Quebec.66 Even 
though the A rticles of Capitulation of 1759 permitted the free exercise of the 
Roman Catholic religion,67 the British Crown would not consent to the 
appointment of a Bishop for Quebec, leaving no authorized religious 
authority within the province. Governor Murray, in secret instructions 
issued the same day as the 1763 Royal Proclamation68 , was mandated not to 
grant any ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the Roman Catholic Church.69 
Instead, he was instructed to establish the Church of England in Quebec so 
that the inhabitants "may by degrees be induced to embrace the Protestant 
religion, and their Children be brought up in the principles of it. "70 As 
Governor Murray learned the job, and as Burke would have predicted, this 
was a practical impossibility, and so Murray deviated from the royal 
65. "To the Electors of Bristol, on his being declared by the Sheriffs, Duly Elected One 
of the Representatives in Parliament for that City, On Thursday The Third November, 
1774" in Burke, Works, supra note 51 at 448. 
66. Burke's liberalism on matters of empire and religious toleration often are attributed 
to the fact that he was born of a Roman Catholic mother. See e.g. John Viscount Morley, 
Burke, rev. ed. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1923) at 6; O'Brien, supra note 16 at 3. The 
same could be said of Burke's position in the case of Quebec and Briand, in particular. 
67. This was modified by the 1763 Treaty of Paris, which added "as far as the Laws of 
Great Britain would permit." 
68. Royal Proclamation, George R., Proclamation, 7 October 1763 (3 Geo. III), reprinted 
in R.S.C. 1985, App. II. No. 1. 
69. W.P.M. Kennedy, Statutes, Treaties and Documents of the Canadian Constitution 1713-
1929, 2d ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1930) at 47-48 [Kennedy, Documents]. 
70. Ibid. The instructions represent the "hateful spirit of jealous exclusiveness" that Garneau 
condemns in his L'Histoire du Caruula - the "embodiment of that deeply seated antipathy of 
race, which served Lord Durham in our own day." Fran<;ois·Xavier Garneau, History of 
Caruula From the Time of its Discovery Till the Union Year 1840-41, vol. 2, trans. by Andrew 
Bell (Montreal: John Lovell, 1862) at 88. 
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instructions in many material respects.71 He proposed the consecration of 
M. Olivier Briand, who would then serve, not as Bishop, but as 
"Superintendent of the Roman Church in Canada."72 Maseres wrote, some 
. time after the event, that it was Burke who had secured this compromise in 
1766 in his capacity as private secretary within the short-lived Rockingham 
Ministry.73 Though this was a matter of some controversy within the 
English-speaking merchant community in Montreal and Quebec City, 
through this compromise the constitution was made to fit the facts.74 
Burke, in other words, pursued mostly an organicist approach to 
constitutional politics in Quebec. 
There is evidence on the other side, however - that is, Burke's 
opposition to the passage of the Quebec Act of 1774 - and it deserves 
some mention. An examination of Cavendish's transcript of the debates 
in the House of Commons reveals that Burke spoke out against the 
passage of the Quebec Act mostly on technical grounds. The Quebec Act 
recognized both civil law and the Roman Catholic religion, yet Burke 
reportedly had supported these proposals while in the Rockingham 
Ministry.75 His voting behaviour might be explained away by the fact 
that he was a paid agent for New York and, as the colony was stripped 
of territory bordering on Lake Champlain, he might have acted 
strategically, at least until the bill was amended in committee.76 But he 
71. See Pierre Tousignant, "The Integration of the Province of Quebec into the British 
Empire 1763-91, Part I: From Royal Proclamation to the Quebec Act" in Dictionary of 
Canadian Biography, vol. 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979) xxxii. 
72. Sir Reginald Coupland, The Quebec Act: A Study in Statesmanship (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1925) at 53-54; Alfred Leroy Bun, The Old Province of Quebec, vol. 1, 
1760-1778 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewan, 1968) at 86-87; Paul Langford, The First 
Rockingham Administration, 1765-1766 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973) at 254. 
73. Francis Maseres, Occasional Essays on Various Subjects Chiefly Political and Historical 
(London: Roben Wilks, 1809) at 369-70. 
74. W.P.M. Kennedy, The Constitution of Canada: An Introduction to its Development 
and Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1931) at 43-44. 
75. Lock, supra note 16 at 357. 
76. Lock, ibid. Also see John Faulkner, "Burke's First Encounter with Richard Price: 
The Chathamites and Nonh America" in Ian Crowe, ed., An Imaginative WDig: 
Reassessing the Life and Thought of Edmund Burke (Columbia: University of Missouri 
Press, 2005) 93 at 104. O'Brien emphasizes the fact that Burke makes no mention of 
Roman Catholic religious establishment in his repon to the New York Assembly on the 
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also justified his vote with reference to prudential arguments. He could 
not endorse the application of local law in matters respecting property 
and civil rights because neither he nor Les Canadiens knew the content of 
that local law, nor was there evidence that they were desirous of 
abandoning newly acquired rights under English law. In these 
circumstances, he could not "form any opinion" on the question of 
restoring the civillaw.77 
Governor Murray originally was instructed to apply English law in 
regard to all matters civil or criminaF8 Murray's ordinance of 1764 
permitted the application of local law, based on La coutume de Paris 
(French customary laws as applied by Les Canadiens), in minor causes of 
action relating to land and civil actions arising prior to October 1764. 
All other matters would be determined having regard to the laws of 
England "as far as the Circumstances and present Situation of Things 
will admit."79 The introduction of English law in regard to most legal 
matters necessarily resulted in "chaos" and "disorder," with little chance 
of securing the allegiance of the local populace.80 Andre Morel reports 
that Les Canadiens simply boycotted the civil courts of Quebec during 
this period,8! though there is little evidence offered to suggest that 
recourse to courts was common before this time.82 Both the Governor 
and colonial authorities in London (the Lords of Trade) recognized that 
the course of legal development required correction. The 1766 report of 
Yorke and deGray (Attorney General and Solicitor General of England, 
respectively), detailing sources of disorder in the administration of 
Quebec Act This silence is "pregnant," O'Brien observes, given the state of anti-Catholic 
zealotry in America. O'Brien, supra note 16 at 92-95. 
77. Kennedy, Documents, supra note 69 at 110. 
78. These instructions are underscored by the Rayal Proclamation of 1763 directing that courts 
be established to hear civil and criminal cases applying principles of law and equity "as near as 
may be agreeable to the Laws of England." See Kennedy, Documents, supra note 69 at 36. 
79. Kennedy, Documents, ibid. at 53. 
80. The term chaos is found in Evelyn Kalish, Nationalismes et conjlits de droits: Le debat 
du droit prive au Quebec, 1760-1840 (Lasalle: Editions Hurtubise,1994) at 31. The term 
disorder is found in "Report of the Attorney and Solicitor General Regarding the Civil 
Government of Quebec, 1766" in Kennedy, Documents, ibid. at 65. 
81. Andre Morel, "La reaction des Canadiens devant l'administration de la justice de 
1764 a 1774: Vne forme de resistance passive" (1960) 20 R. du B. 53 at 55-56. 
82. I am grateful to Rod Macdonald for this point. 
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justice, helped to initiate the sort of accommodation that would come 
to be reflected in the Quebec Act. Yorke and deGray endorsed the 
rehabilitation of pre-conquest laws in respect of all legal matters 
outside of criminal ones. It is the "wise Conquerors" who "proceed 
gently and indulge their Conquer'd subjects in all local Customs 
which are in their own nature indifferent," they observed. 83 It would 
"occasion infinite confusion and Injustice," "to disturb without much 
and WIse deliberation ... the local Customs and Usages now 
prevailing there. "84 
The Attorney General, Edward Thurlow, spoke to British colonial 
sensibilities in his report of 1773 in terms one would have associated 
with Burke: 
When certain forms of civil justice have long been established ... [men] acquire a kind of 
traditional knowledge of the legal effects and consequences of their transactions, sufficient 
and withal absolutely necessary for the common affairs of private life. It is easy to 
imagine what infinite disturbance it would create to introduce new and unknown 
measures of justice; doubt and uncertainty in the transaction; disappointment and loss in 
consequence.85 
For these reasons, Thurlow concluded that it would 
be the interest of the conqueror to leave his new subjects in the utmost degree of private 
tranquility and personal security ... by leaving them in the habit of obedience to their 
accustomed laws than by undertaking the harsher task of compelling a new obedience to 
new laws unheard of before.86 
Thurlow appeared to embrace fully the Burkean angle on things.' 
There appeared to be no reason of "actual and cogent necessity" to alter 
their laws and customs - and certainly no reason to pursue "that ideal 
83. "Report of the Attorney and Solicitor General Regarding the Civil Government of 
Quebec, 1766" in Kennedy, Documents, supra note 69 at 67. 
84. Ibid. at 67. 
85. "Report of the Attorney General, Edwd. Thurlow" in Adam Shortt & Arthur G. 
Doughty, eds., Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada, 1759-1791 
(Ottawa: S.E. Dawson, 1907) 305 at 309. 
86. Ibid. at 309-10. 
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necessity which ingenious speculation may always create by possible 
supposition, remote inference and forced argument. "87 
Burke responded to the Quebec Act with the supposition that English 
law already was in force, and that to induce further change would be 
to introduce "as much an innovation, as if you had made the 
constitution new. "88 He had no "objection to [making] the 
constitution new, provided the necessity of doing so is set in a clear 
and satisfactory manner before me. ,,89 Reintroducing fa coutume de 
Paris as the law of the land would result only in confusion. If it was 
tyranny to impose a law on new subjects which they did not 
understand, it equally was tyrannical to "impose upon them a law 
which we do not understand ourselves."90 Burke's complaint was that 
fa coutume de Paris, which would govern private relations, largely was 
unknown to the British and, at least in the realm of the commercial, 
even to fes Canadiens. 91 Moreover, it may be that Britain's new 
subjects would prefer English law over their ancient practices, wishing 
to adopt the more "beneficial" English system.92 "As a friend to the 
people of Canada, "93 Burke declared, he would oppose the motion 
until he knew more about the facts on the ground. Given the urgency 
with which Parliament was proceeding, and for which there was little 
justification offered, it would be impossible for Burke to give an 
"honest vote."94 He preferred that English law continue to prevail, at 
least until a better case could be made out for the application of local 
law.95 
87. Ibid. at 310 . 
88. Kennedy, Documents, supra note 69 at 109. 
89. Ibid. 
90. Ibid. at 108. 
91. Henry Cavendish, Government Of Canada, Debates Of The House Of Commons In 
The Year 1774, On The Bill For Making More Effectual Provision for The Government Of 
The Province Of Quebec. Drawn up from the notes of The Right Honorable Sir Henry 
Cavendish, Bart., Member for Lostwithiel: Now first published by J. Wright, Editor of The 
Parliamentary History, etc. (London: Ridgeway Piccadilly, 1839) at 85-86. 
92. Kennedy, Documents, supra note 69 at 109. 
93. Ibid. 
94. Cavendish, supra note 91. 
95. Ironically, by voting against the Quebec Act, Burke's actions could be interpreted by 
constituents in the upcoming Bristol election as anti·papist. He "looked like a good 
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On the last theme of constitutional change, it might be thought that 
Burke was so much in the thrall of the ancient constitution that he would 
brook no change. Yet, he would not defer unfailingly to tradition, and so 
he resisted the rigidity that resulted from the cult of foundational 
moments.96 "A state without means of some change," Burke wisely wrote 
in his Reflections on the French Revolution, "is without the means of its 
conservation.,,97 Correction with the aim of conservation could be 
endorsed, but not change for its own sake98_ as he appears to have argued 
in the case of the 1774 Quebec Act. Experiments motivated by the desire, 
for instance, of leveling property could not be condoned. Reformers, he 
maintained, should proceed cautiously with constitutional change. It would 
require more understanding and experience in the practical science of 
government than "any person can gain in his whole life."99 
Conclusion 
My object here has been to link up Whyte's search for the deep 
structure of Canadian constitutional law with the eighteenth century 
constitutional thinking of Edmund Burke. There are, of course, 
important dissimilarities: for example, Burke's adulation of the 
aristocracy and laissez jaire, and his disinterest in aboriginal affairs,IOo are 
strikingly dissimilar to Whyte'S participation in social democratic 
protestant" to Quakers and dissenters in Bristol and so was returned as MP in his first 
and only election in that riding. See O'Brien, supra note 16 at 147-49. 
96. Gibbons, supra note 16 at 169. 
97. Burke, Reflections, supra note 50 at 23. 
98. Bickel, in his essay on Burke, put this well: "We hold to the values of the past provisionally 
only, in the knowledge that they will change, but we hold to them as guides." See Alexander M. 
Bickel, TheMorality o/Consent (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975) at 24. 
99. Burke, Reflections, supra note 50 at 67. 
100. It would appear that more work needs to be done linking Burkean themes to 
aboriginal policy in Nonh America. Among the few references I have found are the 
following: James Tully in Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age 0/ Diversity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) at 66 associates Burke with teleological, 
modernist, constitutional thinking. Anthony J. Hall, meanwhile, in The American Empire 
and the Fourth World: The Bowl with One Spoon, vol. 1 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 2003) at 36-37 interestingly connects Burke's emphasis on 
continuity and tradition to the preservation of First Nations political culture. 
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government initiatives in Saskatchewan. There are, nevertheless, 
interesting meeting points. As Whyte searches for the deeper "common 
conceptions" of Canada's constitutional order, it should be inevitable 
that he runs into constitutional values and ideals that Burke articulated 
at the time of Canada's origins. Though I make no grand claims about 
Burke's influence on British imperial practice in this early period, it 
came to be that British practice had to change direction to fit the 
facts - from accommodating the practice of Roman Catholicism to 
endorsing the civil law based upon fa coutume de Paris. It is not that 
imperial authority always valued pluralism: there are periods when 
assimilation emerges as the primary colonial strategy vis·a·vis both 
aboriginal peoples and fes Canadiens. Nor was imperial authority always 
altruistic: accommodating fes Canadiens was a convenient strategic 
device to help ensure their loyalty to the British Crown as the war over 
America began to heat up. Yet it also, as officials Yorke, de Gray and 
Thurlow note, was the right thing to do. That Whyte has taken up some 
of the arguments of Britain's most notorious and brilliant Whig 
philosopher should come, then, as little surprise. 
What do these liberal origins portend for the future of Canada (and 
English Canada in particular)? If John Whyte correctly has tapped into 
foundational values at Canada's origins - that they are largely liberal, 
founded upon a desire for both liberty and security - there is little to 
distinguish us from other operative liberal political cultures, including the 
United States. In that case, Whyte has described nothing distinctive about 
Canadian constitutional culture. These goals could just as easily be served if 
Canada were absorbed, for instance, into a larger North American political 
unit, as Robert Pastor has suggested. IOI What about those things that make 
us different from the United States - even little things that matter a lot to 
Canadian identity, such as health care and a more activist and 
redistributivist state? 102 Might these be explained with reference to 
liberalism or to federalism or to some other communitarian variant in 
101. Robert F. Pastor, Toward a North American Community: Lessons from the Old 
World to the New (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2001). 
102. I recognize that, for some, these are differences that do not matter so much. See e.g. 
Peter Smith & Janet Ajzenstat, "Canada's Origins: The New Debate" (1997) 1 National 
History: A Canadian Journal of Equity and Opinion 113 at 115. 
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Canadian constitutional culture - the Tory touch, perhaps?103 Will we find 
the resources to defend a distinctive Canadian constitutional culture from 
the pressures of further integration with the United States? I have intended 
to remain agnostic about the answers to these questions. My worry is that, 
until we come to a clearer understanding about such things, the 
disintegration of what it is that makes us different might continue apace. 
103. On the "Tory touch" see Horowitz, supra note 9. Roderick Macdonald has 
discussed these variants in the constitutional law context in "Procedural Due Process in 
Canadian Constitutional Law: Natural Justice and Fundamental Justice" (1987) 39 U. Fla. 
L. Rev. 217, as has Patrick Macklem in "Constitutional Ideologies" (1988) 20 Ottawa L. 
Rev. 117. I explore this very question in further depth in "Property Rights, Investor 
Rights, and Regulatory Innovation: Comparing Constitutional Cultures in Transition" 
I·CON [forthcoming]. 
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